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Sammendrag:. 
 I denne artikkelen søker vi å forstå og forklare 
hvordan EU har påvirket valg og utforming av 
klimapolitiske virkemidler i Norge og Tyskland, på 
tross av sterke etablerte nasjonale preferanser. Vi spør 
på hvilken måte EU har påvirket valg av politisk 
virkemiddel: Har EU vært en avgjørende faktor i å 
forme politikken, eller har nasjonale faktorer betydd 
mer? For å analysere disse spørsmålene empirisk 
fokuserer vi på beslutningsprosessen for et spesielt 
aktuelt og relevant klimapolitisk virkemiddel, nemlig 
kvotehandel. Vi ser på hvilke målsetninger de 
nasjonale myndighetene forsøker å møte, peker på 
målsetningenes underliggende verdier og preferanser, 
og identifiserer på hvilken måte landene har forsøkt å 
nå målsetningene sine. Vi undersøker hvordan denne 
prosessen kan ha blitt påvirket av EU. Vi analyserer 
beslutningsprosessen for innføring av et 
kvotehandelssystem i EU, og diskuterer hvordan 
kvotehandel har blitt introdusert som et reelt 
alternativt politisk virkemiddel i Norge og Tyskland. 
Vi ser på i hvilken grad EU ser ut til å ha påvirket valg 
av dette virkemiddelet i de to landene, og peker på 
mulige årsaker.  
Abstract:  
In this paper, we seek to understand and explain how 
the EU has influenced the climate change 
policymaking processes in Norway and Germany, 
despite strong prior national preferences. We ask how 
the EU has affected the choice and design of climate 
policy instruments. Has the EU been a decisive factor 
in shaping policy responses, or has domestic politics 
mattered more? To address these questions 
empirically, we focus on the policy formulation of a 
particularly relevant and recently debated climate 
policy issue, namely, emissions trading. We focus on 
the objectives that national governments have sought 
to meet, examine the values and principles underlying 
those objectives, identify the means through which 
each country has attempted to achieve their desired 
goals, and go on to investigate how this process  may 
have been influenced by the EU. We analyze the 
policymaking process for an emissions trading scheme 
in the EU, and discuss the processes through which 
emissions trading has been introduced as a policy 
instrument alternative in Norway and Germany. We 
examine the extent to which the EU appears to have 
influenced policy instrument choice in the two 
countries and suggest reasons for this. 
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1 Introduction  
The European Union (EU) has become a major political actor in the region. Not only has the 
recent enlargement process extended the institution’s membership from 15 to 25 countries, 
but more policy fields are becoming subject to EU regulation. Foreign and environmental 
policies, for example, are increasingly coordinated for all EU member countries. As a result, 
the EU affects the development of important policy areas both in Member States, such as 
Germany, and in non-member countries, such as Norway.1 In this chapter, we seek to 
understand and explain how the EU – a powerful political and economic institution within the 
region – has influenced the climate change policymaking processes in two countries, despite 
strong prior national preferences. More specifically, we ask how the EU has affected climate 
policy instrument choice in Germany and Norway. Has it been a decisive factor in shaping 
policy responses, or has domestic politics mattered more? 
To address these questions in a real-world context, we focus on the policy formulation of a 
particularly relevant and recently debated climate policy issue, namely, emissions trading 
(ET). At the Kyoto Conference in 1997, Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change acknowledged that trading in emissions allowances was a cost-effective 
instrument to achieve greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions. The specific details of 
how the instrument could be implemented were not decided at the time, but were left to 
subsequent international climate change negotiations. It was not until the Seventh Conference 
of the Parties in Marrakech in 2001 that agreement was finally reached on the issue. Since the 
Third Conference of the Parties in Kyoto (1997), emissions trading schemes have been central 
to foreign policy discourses in the EU, Germany and Norway, and hence provide a good basis 
for a case study into how the EU may have influenced the formation of national policy in 
these two European countries. We focus on the objectives that national governments have 
sought to meet, examine the values and principles underlying those objectives, identify the 
means through which each country has attempted to achieve their desired goals, and go on to 
investigate how this process  may have been influenced by the EU.  
We begin with an explanation of the analytical framework underpinning this chapter, 
namely, interest-based theory and the role of ideas in international climate change policy. We 
argue that these perspectives frame policy instrument choice, which is the outcome of the 
interplay between domestic actors and institutions on the one hand, and international 
organizations, institutions and regimes on the other.  
As a background to understanding EU influence, the third section of this chapter 
systematically lays out the policymaking process for an emissions trading scheme (ETS) in 
the EU. The fourth section presents country profiles for Norway and Germany. We then go on 
to discuss in more detail the processes through which ET has been introduced as a policy 
instrument alternative in the two countries. In the fifth section, we examine the extent to 
which the EU appears to have influenced policy instrument choice in Norway and Germany 
and suggest reasons for this. Finally, we draw some conclusions.  
2 Analytical framework  
Our point of departure for understanding EU influence on policy instrument choice is 
anchored in interest-based theory. This implies that we assume climate policy instrument 
choice to be the result of bargains struck among different constituencies with a stake in 
climate change policy. To explain policy instrument choice, therefore, we focus on 
identifying the groups that participate in this process, their relative influence, and the 
1 Norway is a member of the European Economic Area, but has rejected EU membership twice after 
referenda in 1972 and 1994.  
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strategies and tactics they employ (Barkdull and Harris 2002: 74-5). In addition, we briefly 
examine the flow of an idea, i.e. ET, in international climate politics. Our assumption is that 
new ideas might show states novel ways to pursue their interests, whether unilaterally or in 
collaboration (Barkdull and Harris 2002: 67). Such a perspective can help us to ascertain how 
the concept of ET spilled over from the Kyoto negotiation process to the EU and domestic 
levels. Furthermore, a “policy transfer” approach is applied to investigate how and why a 
transfer in policy instrument choice occurs (Damro and Mendez 2003: 74). We assume that 
this transfer incorporates a range of processes - from coercive to voluntary, and involves the 
participation of both domestic and international actors.  
Hence, our level of analysis is twofold. First, we demonstrate that the EU is one of several 
systemic factors influencing Norway and Germany’s decision-making. We then go on to 
suggest that the international system – including factors and institutions such as the EU, the 
Kyoto Protocol and international trade arrangements – influences state identities, their 
interests and behavior (Barkdull and Harris 2002: 71). Throughout the climate negotiations, 
the EU’s overall goals have reflected three distinct objectives: a commitment to stringent 
emissions reductions, a need to protect the internal market’s international competitiveness, 
and a growing internal demand for EU leadership in international climate change policy 
(Damro and Mendez 2003: 73). We point out how policy instrument choice in Norway and 
Germany has been guided by such systemic factors.  
Second, our analysis takes place at the domestic level, where a struggle for influence 
between national social groups is assumed to be important for understanding policy 
instrument choice. Domestic climate policy is the result of conflict and compromise, where 
the assumption is that government has only partial control over the outcome, and is influenced 
and constrained by society (Underdal 1998: 13). Understanding the different interests and 
domestic compromises that have been made in Norway and Germany will therefore be 
important in explaining and understanding how ET as a new policy instrument came to be a 
reality in these two countries.  
The sets of forces influencing the policy instrument transfer by the two governments are 
analyzed in this chapter within the international and domestic context. International forces 
include: trade, international prestige, Kyoto emission commitments, and of course, the EU, 
which represents an important political and economic supranational institution within Europe. 
National forces include: the policy environment, institutional structures, energy resource 
bases, economic interests, and national factors relevant to environmental needs. It is argued 
that international and domestic forces feed into the stream of policymaking, helping to 
explain the choice of ET as the new, preferred policy instrument.  This conceptual framework 
is illustrated in Figure 1.  
EU Emission Trading as Policy Instrument Shift
Policy 
Instrument
Time HorizonPolicy 
Instrument
International Forces
EU
National Forces
  
Figure 1. Emissions trading as a policy instrument transfer 
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The timeframe of our analysis begins in December 1997 at the Kyoto Summit, and 
progresses to July 2003, when an emission trading scheme was established for all EU 
members. It ends in March 2004, when the Norwegian government announced plans to adopt 
a domestic ETS mirroring the EU system.  
3 Emissions trading as a new policy instrument 
Before we go on to discuss the potential impact of EU membership on policymaking at the 
domestic level in Germany and Norway, we take a brief look at how ET emerged as a policy 
instrument at the EU level. 
3.1 The EU: From skeptic to policy innovator 
Today it is hard to imagine a more enthusiastic proponent of ET as a climate policy 
instrument than the EU. In July 2003, after a lengthy consultation process, the EU passed a 
directive establishing a ground-breaking, internal ETS for carbon dioxide (CO2), due to be 
fully operational in 2005. Yet an observer at the Kyoto summit of 1997 could be forgiven for 
expressing surprise at this somewhat unexpected turn of events. The EU had, after all, put up 
fierce resistance to the flexibility mechanisms during conference negotiations. The delegation 
only agreed to the inclusion of Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol (paving the way for an ETS) 
under severe pressure from the United States, who made it clear that agreement on targets and 
timetables – a cornerstone of EU policy – was contingent on the inclusion of market-based 
instruments.   
So how did this significant U-turn come about? We begin with a survey of the key events 
leading up to the establishment of an internal EU ETS, which is summarized in Table 1. To 
follow, we investigate the features of the new scheme before going on to explore events at the 
domestic level.  
At Kyoto, the EU position was one of risk-prevention leadership. This refers to its 
commitment to the precautionary principle (see COM(2000) 1 for details), and to an 
environmental policy historically based on, ‘stringent CO2 reductions, fierce protection of the 
internal market’s international competitiveness and a desire for leadership in global climate 
change policy’ (Damro and Méndez 2003: 75). From its conception in the 1980s, EU climate 
policy had centered on regulation and harmonization, targets and timetables. Flexibility 
mechanisms, such as ET, had been viewed with caution and even suspicion, as it was feared 
that such policy instruments would only serve to create loopholes allowing some countries 
(the US in particular) to buy their way out of making domestic emissions reductions. More to 
the point, it was thought that such instruments may ultimately pose a threat to EU 
competitiveness by hampering economic interests and undermining EU attempts to establish 
itself as a global environmental leader.   
Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol introduced ET as one of the three flexibility mechanisms 
available to assist industrialized countries to meet their emissions reduction targets. The 
subsequent EU dialogue, initiated by the European Commission during the two years 
proceeding Kyoto,2 could thus be seen as a reaction to the EU’s international commitment to 
the establishment of a global GHG trading system. The Commission expressed repeated 
support for a public dialogue on an internal ETS, suggesting that, ‘the best preparation for the 
Community and its Member States might be to develop their own ET experience.’3 In keeping 
2 See “Towards an EU Post-Kyoto Strategy” COM (1998) 353 and “Preparing for Implementation of 
the Kyoto Protocol” COM (1999) 230.  
3 See “Preparing for Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol” COM (1999) 230. 
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with this sentiment, a Green Paper launching an EU consultation process on ET was 
published in the spring of 2000, which advocated a bottom-up pathway. Soon after, a working 
group comprising representatives from Member States, industry, and environmental pressure 
groups was established under the auspices of the European Climate Policy Programme, which 
in May 2001, presented its support for the launch of an EU ETS. This somewhat informal 
process was eventually formalized in autumn 2001, when the Commission put forward their 
‘Proposal for a Directive for greenhouse gas emissions trading within the European 
Community,’ thus beginning the legislative process at Member State and EU level 
(Commission 2001: 581). The European Council and Parliament tabled amendments to the 
Directive in late 2002 and early 2003 respectively. The Proposal was finally approved in July 
2003, and the Directive entered into force three months later, establishing an internal ETS to 
be operative in 2005.   
Table 1: Emissions trading and the EU 
Year Event Significance 
Dec 
1997 
Kyoto Protocol (Article 17) - Commits the EU to reducing GHG emissions by 8 
per cent from 1990 levels during the period 2008 
and 2012  
- Introduces ET as one of three flexible mechanisms 
to be operationalized internationally 
Jun 
1998 
Commission Communication to the 
Council and Parliament: Climate 
Change – Towards an EU Post-Kyoto 
Strategy 
COM(1998) 353 
- Launches target date for ETS as 2005, ‘the 
Community could set up its own internal trading 
regime by 2005 as an expression of its 
determination to promote the achievement of 
[Kyoto] targets in a cost-effective way’ 
- Advocates a step-by-step approach in the 
development of ETS 
May  
1999 
Commission Communication to the 
Council and Parliament: Preparing for 
Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol 
COM(1999) 230 
- States urgent need for an informed debate on the 
instruments of ETS; proposes Green Paper 
- Suggests ETS should initially be limited to CO2 in 
‘key sectors,’ but should gradually be extended to 
other sectors and gases 
Mar 
2000 
Green Paper on GHG ET within the 
EU  
COM (2000) 87 
- Establishes consultation process, ‘which will allow 
all stakeholders, both governmental and non-
governmental, to give their opinions on how the EU 
should strike the right balance in the use of ET’  
Jul 
2000 
European Climate Policy Programme 
established 
- Working group investigates climate policy 
alternatives; in May 2001 recommends ETS is 
established ‘as soon as practicable’ 
Oct 
2001 
Proposal for a Directive for GHG ET 
within the EU  
COM(2001) 581 
- Begins legislation process at EU and Member 
State level 
Dec 
2002 
Council presents Amended Proposal 
for a Directive of the European 
Parliament (EP) and Council 
- Establishes scheme for GHG ET within the EU  
- Amended by EP in spring 2003 
Jul  
2003 
EP and Council approve Proposal for 
Directive establishing internal ETS  
COM(2003) 403 
- ETS to be operative in 2005 and to be extended to 
all Member States of the enlarged EU   
Oct 
2003 
Directive of EP and Council published 
in Official Journal of EU 
- Directive establishing EU ETS officially enters into 
force  
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3.1.1 Features of the new EU emissions trading scheme 
The newly approved EU ETS gives Member States flexibility in meeting Burden Sharing 
Agreement4 targets by establishing a multi-national trading system in GHG emissions 
allowances. The underlying motive behind the scheme is that it encourages installations, i.e. 
individual firms, to make emissions reductions at the lowest cost to the economy, driving 
efficiency and fostering innovation. Central features of the mandatory system due to enter 
force in 2005 are: limited coverage, permit allocation by Member States, non-compliance 
penalties, an opt-out for individual installations, and the inclusion of CDM project-based 
mechanisms. These elements are discussed further below.      
Coverage 
Gases: Although the Directive covers all Kyoto GHGs in principle, it states that for the first 
phase, ET will be confined to CO2. The gas accounts for over 80 per cent of EU GHG 
emissions, and it is estimated that units participating in the scheme will be responsible for 46 
per cent of CO2 emissions in 2010.    
Sectors: The scheme applies to energy-intensive companies such as power plants, steel 
factories, oil refineries, paper mills, and glass and cement installations.   
Allocation 
The mandatory system with unspecified caps gives Member States the responsibility to set 
reduction targets and allocate emissions allowances. Ninety-five per cent of permits must be 
distributed free of charge in 2005-7 (falling to 90 per cent from 2008), but governments may 
choose to auction the remainder. Allocation must be based on an emissions path compatible 
with national targets, and must also comply with the criteria laid out by the Commission in 
Annex III of the Directive. Member States were required to submit National Allocation Plans 
to the Commission by 31st March 2004, detailing the quantity and allocation of allowances in 
order to minimize market distortions. Five members met this deadline, and as of May 2004, a 
total of twelve states have submitted their final plans, while five more have delivered draft 
proposals.5    
Compliance 
Strict non-compliance penalties of €40/t CO2 will apply in 2005-7, rising to €100/t of GHG 
emissions from 2008. A strong financial deterrent was implemented in the interest of 
efficiency and political acceptability, and drew from the experience of the US SO2 trading 
scheme, which achieved an ‘excellent compliance record’ as a result of the imposition of 
monetary penalties (Christiansen and Wettestad 2003: 5). 
Opt-out 
Individual firms (but not sectors) can opt out of the trading system if they can demonstrate a 
commitment to making the equivalent emissions reductions. The opt-out is restricted to the 
first phase of the scheme, and is most likely to be used by Britain (where an ETS has already 
been established) and possibly also Germany (where there is a history of voluntary 
environmental agreements). 
4 Commonly referred to as the ‘EU-bubble’. Within the bubble, the EU is allowed to distribute 
emission reductions between member countries, thus providing a flexible and cost-effective way of 
reaching the target of 8% emissions reductions. 
5 Member States that have submitted their final National Action Plans are: Germany, Finland, Ireland, 
Denmark, Austria, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Sweden, Slovenia, Lithuania, the United Kingdom 
and the Slovak Republic. Latvia, Portugal, Belgium, Italy and Estonia have only provided the 
Commission with draft proposals.  
See: http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/climat/emission_plans.htm for more details. 
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Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) 
The EU ETS will accept credits from CDM projects from 2005, and from JI schemes from 
2008 (in accordance with the recently amended Linking Directive6). 
3.2 Norway and Germany: Country profiles  
Having schematically discussed the policymaking process in the EU, we now turn to Norway 
and Germany. The country profiles highlight the special circumstances that have been 
important in climate change policymaking. We then move on to point out how the transition 
to ETS occurred in each of the countries.  
In the early 1990s, German GHG emissions were significantly reduced. The trend 
continued in the late 1990s, but at a slower pace. Emissions are projected to fall by 33.6 per 
cent by 2010, (see Table 2). In contrast, Norwegian emissions are growing steadily and 
projections highlight an increasing gap between likely emissions levels and Kyoto 
commitment targets. 
Table 2: Emissions trends. Germany and Norway’s Kyoto commitments, actual and 
projected emissions 
Country Kyoto 
commitment 
Actual 
emissions 
(2000) 
Projected 
emissions 
(2010) 
“Gap” between 
projections and 
commitments in 
2008-12 
 % % % % 
Germany - 217 - 19.1 - 33.6 -12.6 
Norway + 1 + 6 + 22 + 21 
Sources: National Communications (NC3) and figures from the Climate Secretariat (UNFCCC) 
 
3.2.1 Norway 
Norway’s distinctive energy and industry profile is characterized by a heavy reliance on 
hydroelectric power, oil and natural gas extraction, and high demand for transport.  
Hydropower fuels domestic energy consumption (99 per cent of electricity production), and 
forms the basis for the energy-intensive process industry, which currently accounts for a fifth 
of the country’s GHG emissions (NC3 2002: 61). A decentralized settlement pattern makes 
transport the largest emitter – producing 31 per cent of GHGs (1999), while the petroleum 
industry was responsible for a further quarter in 2000 (Statistics Norway 2003). Oil and gas 
are key sectors, contributing 30 to 47 per cent to export revenue, and between 11 and 25 per 
cent to GDP in 1998-2000 (NC3 2002: 17). Taken together, these factors lead to high 
abatement costs for Norway. 
The introduction of a CO2 tax and the onset of an economic recession resulted in falling 
GHG emissions in the early 1990s (see Figure 2). However, levels soon began to rise, and are 
now projected to increase by 22 per cent between 1990 and 2010 (see Table 2). Norway 
ratified the Kyoto Protocol in May 2002, but faces considerable challenges in meeting its 
commitment target of a 1 per cent increase from 1990 levels. 
                                                     
6On 20th April 2004, the European Parliament adopted an amendment bringing forward the starting date 
of the ‘Linking Directive,’ which will allow credits from CDM projects to be used from 2005, rather 
than 2008 (as proposed by the European Commission).    
7 Strictly speaking, Germany’s Kyoto commitment is -8 per cent, as this was the figure negotiated for 
the EU block as a whole. However, its national target according to the ‘EU bubble’ system is a 21 per 
cent reduction in GHG emissions.   
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3.2.2 Germany 
In contrast to Norway, Germany has managed to implement GHG emissions cuts of 19 per 
cent since 1990. Largely owing to the structural changes resulting from reunification, it is 
well on track to meeting its Kyoto target of a 21 per cent reduction from 1990 levels by 2005 
(see Table 2). With the exception of the transport sector, it has managed to reduce emissions 
in all source groups, through measures including: reduced coal and lignite consumption; 
economic and industrial restructuring; and improved energy efficiency and management 
practices (IEA 2002).    
Limited indigenous energy resources make Germany increasingly reliant on imports of 
natural gas, oil, and even coal – which still fuels 50 per cent of electricity production. 
Although hard coal remains heavily subsidized (IEA 2002), the state has also given financial 
support to green electricity. Renewables currently account for only 2.6 per cent of total 
energy use (IEA 2002), but Germany has a quarter of the world’s installed wind power 
capacity.  
There is no doubt that Germany achieved significant emissions reductions during the 
1990s.  However, the opportunity awarded by reunification was unique, and it will be much 
more politically and economically costly to reduce emissions further and reach the 
government’s ambitious target of an additional 25 per cent reduction in CO2 emissions from 
1990 levels by 2005. 
0
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Figure 2: Emissions of GHGs in Germany and Norway 1990-2000. Million tonnes of 
CO2 equivalents. The left axis shows Norwegian absolute emissions, while the right 
axis shows German.  
Source: UNFCCC 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the structural differences between Norway, Germany, and the EU as a 
whole. In the following sections we discuss how their contrasting economic profiles caused 
our case study countries to develop very different national positions on the idea of ET as a 
climate policy instrument at the outset.  
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Figure 3: Relative GHG emissions in Norway and Germany by source, 20008  
Source: UNFCCC 
 
3.2.3 Emissions trading and Norway  
Objectives and underlying values and principles 
In many ways, Norway led the EU in terms of its willingness to accept the flexibility 
mechanisms that were agreed upon at the Kyoto Conference. The shift from command and 
control instruments to a more market-oriented approach took place in the early 1990s. 
Underlying these approaches were the polluter pays principle and the precautionary principle 
that had been incorporated into Norwegian environmental policies in the 1970s and 80s 
respectively (Jansen and Osland 1996: 188-9). By the close of the 1980s, a desire to be an 
instigator in international environmental politics began to gather momentum (Andresen and 
Butenschøn 2001: 338). This was partly driven by Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland’s 
position as Chairperson of the UN World Commission on Environment and Development. 
The resulting report, Our Common Future, was published in 1987, and singled out climate 
change as a key issue. This spilled over into the national political arena (Bang 2004: 268-
269), and fostered strong public awareness of environmental concerns in the run-up to the 
1989 parliamentary election. It also contributed to the country’s willingness to be among the 
first to adopt a unilateral policy target of stabilizing CO2 emissions at 1989 levels by 2000. 
However, it soon became apparent that the stabilization target conflicted with vital 
economic interests, such as the expansion of the oil industry and plans to export natural gas to 
Europe. This led to a distinct change in policy objectives, based on the principles of 
international cost-effectiveness, flexibility, and ET. Norway supported US initiatives to 
                                                     
8 Discrepancies between the data in this figure and the text are due to domestic sectors being 
categorised differently by national statistics bureaux to reflect their contrasting national circumstances. 
We have included Figure 3 – based on UNFCCC categories – to give a comparative overview.  
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introduce the idea of flexibility mechanisms at the climate change negotiations as early as 
1991. It abandoned the stabilization target a few years later (Hovden and Lindseth 2002: 149).   
Policy instruments 
Norway’s first policy response to the climate change challenge was to implement a set of 
environmental taxes and regulations. First and foremost, a CO2 tax was adopted in 1991, 
which became, and still is, the country’s chief climate policy instrument. Industries exposed 
to international competition, such as the process industry, were exempt from the tax, which 
was levied on almost two-thirds of CO2 emissions and covered just under half of total GHG 
output (White Paper No. 54, 2000-1).  
 As a follow-up to Norway’s Kyoto commitments and to a state-appointed Green Tax 
Commission Report, in 1998, the center-coalition government proposed broad environmental 
tax reforms to incorporate the sectors previously enjoying exemptions from the tax9. While 
environmental NGOs supported the government’s recommendations, business associations 
and energy intensive industries were highly critical. Between 1995 and 1997, they had 
pressed for voluntary agreements, voicing skepticism that taxation would deliver the desired 
environmental benefits and arguing that the measure was just a ploy to broaden the 
government’s tax base at their expense. In the post-Kyoto climate (1997 onwards), however, 
their attention quickly turned to ET. Business and industry began to lobby for the introduction 
of an international ETS in place of the CO2 tax because it allowed them to substitute 
expensive domestic mitigation measures with cheaper emissions reductions abroad. 
Opposition parties, which had close links to the energy intensive industries, claimed that ET 
would improve efficiency, and suggested that industry’s competitiveness problem could be 
solved by the allocation of free quotas. Under duress, the government agreed to examine the 
potential benefits of a national ETS. This process was independent of the EU, and inspired by 
the Kyoto Protocol’s opening for enterprises to participate in ET.  
From green taxes to domestic emissions trading 
To a large extent, the reasoning behind Norway’s increased focus on ET can be traced back to 
its energy profile, the economic interests of the state, and its commitment to the climate 
change issue. As already discussed, the country’s dependence on hydropower, combined with 
its status as a large petroleum producer, meant that it faced high emissions abatement costs. It 
is perhaps therefore unsurprising that when an economically and environmentally efficient 
solution to the climate problem presented itself in the form of ET, it very quickly made it onto 
the agenda, especially given the highly institutionalized links between industry organizations, 
the major political parties (in particular the Labor and Conservative Parties), and interest 
groups (Kasa 2000).   
Our claim is that the motivation to introduce ET came primarily from the Kyoto Protocol, 
domestic academics, and industries likely to suffer from broad environmental tax reform, 
rather than from the EU. Instead, the European influence was confined to shaping the design 
of the domestic ETS that Norway now intends to implement.   
Important academic contributions emerged when a government-appointed Commission 
presented its evaluation of ET as a policy instrument for Norway in December 1999. To a 
large extent, its recommendations were adopted in June 2001, when the new Labor minority 
government proposed that the CO2 tax be replaced with an ETS from 2008, to include all 
Kyoto gases (NOU 2000:1).10 The plan was the result of fierce lobbying on the part of both 
the industry sector and the Ministry of the Environment.   
9 White Paper No. 29 1997-98 and White Paper No. 54 1997-98 
10 Although the recommendations were adopted, agreement was not unanimous. 
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Following the General Election of 2001, the new center-right government (Liberals, 
Christian Democats and Conservatives) signaled a change in environment policy when it 
presented a supplementary White Paper in March 2002 (White Paper No. 15, 2001-2). Among 
other measures, it proposed a mandatory ETS for industries not covered by the CO2 tax, 
designed to be a supplement to the tax in the pre-Kyoto period (2005-7). The shift to a broad 
ETS from 2008 had wide parliamentary support, and was backed by powerful industry groups 
such as the petroleum sector, which stood to gain financially from an ETS, as the price of 
emissions permits was expected to be significantly lower than the carbon tax rate.11 On the 
other hand, the proposed pre-Kyoto ETS was controversial, and was heavily criticized by 
industry, and the Labor and Progressive Parties, who preferred voluntary agreements. Key 
features of the government’s proposed scheme in 2002 were as follows:  
• Coverage Participation limited to sectors exempt from the CO2 tax (primarily the 
process industry). Some GHGs to be included from 2005 (CO2 and other climate 
gases from industries exempt from the CO2 tax for the majority of their emissions) 
(White paper No. 15 2002:7), but all to be incorporated in 2008 - covering 
approximately 80 per cent of emissions.  
• Allocation Free allocation of emissions allowances (2005-7). Opportunity to auction 
and discriminate between sectors from 2008 (e.g. free quotas may be allocated to 
activities vulnerable to international competition). 
• Compliance Standardized, binding, and transparent monitoring; verification and 
reporting procedure; sanctions for non-compliance.  
• Clean Development Mechanism Credits from CDM projects to be included from 2005. 
EU influence on the Norwegian ETS 
Norway has long stated its preference to implement a system that is compatible with an EU 
ETS. The government has actively tried to influence the EU policymaking process, and has 
asked for “sufficient flexibility to reflect national circumstances” (Brende 2002). However, its 
efforts have met with little success. 
Norwegian objections to the EU system have been threefold. First, it wanted to “opt-in” the 
major polluting domestic sectors that are excluded from the European scheme, such as the 
process industry, to make the system as broad as possible. Second, it would have liked to 
include more GHGs. The EU Directive is restricted to CO2, which covers 46 per cent of EU 
GHG emissions, but only 27 per cent of Norway’s. A third bone of contention has been the 
allocation of emissions rights. Norway prefers free allocation in 2005-7, followed by 
auctioning in the Kyoto period, but the EU system allows 5 per cent of allowances to be 
auctioned from 2005, and only 10 per cent from 2008. 
In March 2004, the Norwegian Minister for the Environment announced his country’s 
intention to implement a domestic ETS in 2005 that will be compatible with the EU ETS 
(Brende 2004). Perhaps of greatest surprise is that Norway will develop a system largely in 
line with the EU ETS instead of requiring special treatment on the basis of its unusual 
economic structure, which many had expected would be a necessary condition for Norwegian 
entry into the EU system. As a result, the process industry, representing Norway’s main 
potential source of emissions reductions, will only take on responsibilities in the form of 
voluntary agreements. Meanwhile, Norway’s road transport, oil and gas sectors will continue 
11 During the parliamentary legislative process of the Norwegian pre-Kyoto ETS in late 2004, the 
Norwegian Oil Industry Association (OLF) were actively promoting a “solution” which should be 
better for the global climate: including the offshore industry in the pre-Kyoto ETS. However, the fact 
that inclusion in the pre-Kyoto ETS would save the oil industry 3.6 billion NOK in CO2 taxes, was not 
stressed. 
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to be covered by the CO2 tax until 2008. If a broader ETS is introduced, it could imply a huge 
tax relief for these sectors since permit prices will be lower than the tax level.  
Following on from the March announcement, the Ministry of the Environment held a 
public hearing to discuss the draft legislation in June 2004. It emphasized Norway’s intention 
to negotiate an agreement in accordance with the Directive’s article 25 with the European 
Commission that would provide for a mutual recognition of allowances between the EU ETS 
and the ETS. 
 Despite Norway’s previous reservations, it is now prepared to compromise its more 
ambitious system – in terms of gases and sectors – in order to adapt to the EU scheme. While 
it can be argued that it has a legal right to reject the Directive, it would be difficult to justify 
on political and economic grounds, as such a move may endanger its EEA agreement. Its 
willingness to join an ETS that may cover as little as 10 per cent of its greenhouse gas 
emissions (Torvanger 2004), gives an indication of the strength of EU influence on 
Norwegian climate policy.  
3.2.4 Emissions trading and Germany  
Objectives and underlying values and principles 
While the Kyoto Protocol put ET on the agenda for the EU, it was EU interest that sparked 
the domestic debate in Germany. The objectives that the German Federal government has 
sought to achieve through its climate change policy have been constant since the issue was 
put on the political agenda in the late 1980s. With considerable focus on making 
environmentally efficient emissions reductions domestically, Germany has also been keen to 
play a leading role internationally, but at the same time defend the competitiveness of its large 
manufacturing industry.  
There are several values and principles underlying these goals. First, the precautionary 
principle has had a central position in German environmental policy. The proposition implies 
that in spite of scientific uncertainty, the climate change issue should be addressed with 
precautionary measures. Second, green values run strong in German public opinion. This 
gives all political parties good reason to promote proactive environmental policies. Third, as a 
major economic force in Europe, Germany has wanted to show leadership. Climate change 
has provided the country with a real opportunity to do this, in contrast to other issue areas, 
such as international peace-keeping. Finally, it has been important to ensure that Germany 
remains an attractive location for industry. Promoting equal opportunities for firms, especially 
in the common market, has therefore been an important aspect of climate change policy (Bang 
2004: 291-298).  
The unique event of reunification allowed Germany to meet several of these policy 
objectives simultaneously. Modernizing outdated factories in East Germany resulted in huge 
windfall cuts in national GHG emissions. This allowed impressive emissions reductions to be 
made without exposing the manufacturing and process industries to negative economic 
consequences.   
Policy instruments 
Germany approached the climate change challenge with a set of command and control policy 
instruments that had been tried and tested in other policy fields. Three types of regulations 
were preferred: environmental laws, ordinances, and technical specifications. With a strong 
legalistic-bureaucratic tradition in German politics, these policy instruments were preferred 
by both the Christian-Conservative-Liberal and the Red-Green coalitions.  
Furthermore, the voluntary agreement between industry associations and government, 
directed at CO2 emissions reductions, had broad political support. The 1996 agreement 
committed industrial associations – representing four-fifths of industrial energy consumers – 
to reducing CO2 emissions by 20 per cent from 1990 levels by 2005 (Bang 2004: 229).With 
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this policy measure , Germany achieved both emissions reductions and consensus in 
policymaking, as well as avoiding legal mandatory regulation of the industry sector. In other 
words, the decision to implement a voluntary agreement instead of carbon taxes was made in 
“the shadow of the law” (Würzel et al. 2003: 120).  
When the Red-Green coalition took office in 1998, it had become evident that the 
reunification effect was wearing off and that intensified policy measures were needed to 
continue the trend of national emissions cuts. The government initiated a five-step ecological 
tax reform to reinforce climate policy. Furthermore, it presented a new and intensified 
national climate change protection program in October 2000, where the voluntary agreement 
and the ecological tax reform were presented as the most vital ingredients. The scheme did 
not mention ET as a serious alternative for German climate policy. Although researchers 
began discussing the topic academically in 199712 when it became part of the Kyoto Protocol, 
policymakers did not approach the issue until 2000-1. Our claim is that ET entered the 
German policy agenda as a direct result of the internal discussions in the EU, and the 
policymaking process leading to the proposed Directive in 2001.  
Emissions trading as a new policy instrument 
Germany had managed to cut its GHG emissions by 18.5 per cent from 1990 levels by 2000. 
The Federal government pointed to its command and control approach – combining   
mandatory and voluntary policy measures – as the main reason for this reduction (BMU 
2001), though reunification certainly had an important part to play. Furthermore, the 
government specifically expressed that a new policy instrument must not reduce the 
effectiveness of its current climate protection program. Chancellor Schröder publicly opposed 
an ETS, while Environment Minister Jürgen Trittin supported it (Würzel et al. 2003: 124).  
Moreover, strong industrial pressure groups in Germany have been reluctant to accept the 
introduction of an ETS. In particular, the German Industry Association (BDI), the Chemical 
Industry Association (VCI), and the energy intensive sector have voiced strong opposition. A 
2002 survey points out that general knowledge about ET has been quite low in German 
industry, especially in small- and medium-sized firms (Santarius and Ott 2002: 5). Many 
companies would like to preserve the voluntary agreement, and have expressed concern that 
an ETS might not take into account the “early action”13 reductions implemented through the 
voluntary agreement since 1995.   
Meanwhile, other business sectors, such as banking, have strongly supported the 
implementation of an ETS (Würzel et al. 2003: 127-128), which is perhaps of no great 
surprise given the likely benefits to the industry of the creation of a new financial market.  
We argue that the discourse on ET in Germany was primarily a response to activities at the 
EU level, but also a reaction to developments in other Member States, i.e. Denmark and the 
UK. Suddenly, Germany found itself in jeopardy of losing its leadership role. It appeared that 
if the country didn’t form a clear position on the issue, an EU-wide ETS could be imposed 
from above that they may have little or no influence over.  
In the tradition of consensus policymaking, the Federal government’s reaction to this 
growing concern was to establish the German Emissions Trading Group (AGE) in October 
2000. The Working Group brought together representatives from the Federal and Länder 
governments, the German Bundestag, trade and industry (30 companies and 9 industrial 
associations), and environmental groups and agencies. The level of disagreement within the 
group was high. The chemical and aluminum industries were so opposed to ET that they ran 
12 There were earlier academic discussions on ET in the 1980s and 1990s, but it became revitalized as a 
result of the Kyoto Protocol negotiations with its focus on ET as a preferred policy instrument.  
13 Taking “early action” into account refers to selecting an early base year so that companies making 
emissions reductions early on are not penalised. 
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an ad-campaign in 2001 warning of the adverse economic consequences of ET for German 
industry (Butzengeiger et al. 2003: 221). The Federal government, meanwhile, was starting to 
warm to the principle of an EU-wide ETS. It saw the idea of the scheme as a means through 
which domestic climate policy objectives could be met cost-effectively.  Furthermore, ETS 
could potentially lift Germany to the forefront of an innovative environmental trading 
scheme, and in doing so revive its role as an environmental pioneer.  
In September 2001, AGE presented its findings in a report that was widely supportive of an 
EU-wide ETS. It contained the following recommendations:  
• Launch of EU ETS with a voluntary three-year pilot scheme including economic 
incentives for participation 
• Coverage Participation limited to firms with proven ambitious reduction 
commitments; scheme initially limited to CO2, but to be extended to all six Kyoto 
GHGs  
• Allocation Absolute emissions caps, allocation of permits through hybrid system 
combining grandfathering and auctions 
• Compliance Standardized, binding and transparent monitoring, verification and 
reporting procedure; penalties for non-compliance 
• JI and CDM emissions credits to be included 
These recommendations were accepted by the Federal government, and presented in a 
Position Paper at an EU Commission discussion later that month. In addition, German 
industry pressured the government to propose an “opt-out” clause, giving Member States the 
right to withdraw sectors from the ETS pilot phase. Furthermore, the Federal government was 
pushed into proposing a “pooling-model” that would allow industry sectors to pool emission 
allowances in order to maximize cost-efficiency. Finally, Germany also proposed that “early 
action” be acknowledged (Butzengeiger et al. 2003: 221).   
Since 2002, ET has been accepted as an unavoidable development in Germany. Rather than 
opposing the implementation of the policy instrument outright, the Federal government and 
German interest groups have sought to influence the proposed EU scheme. But to what extent 
have they been successful? Germany’s interests were perhaps better defended in the EU 
Directive proposed in October 2001 than in the final form of the Directive passed in July 
2003, but the ultimate outcome was largely what the Germans had campaigned for. In line 
with German requests, permits will be allocated free of charge (with a small proportion 
available for auction); the system will cover CO2, (to be extended to other GHGs in the 
future); monitoring and reporting is to be standardized and binding; penalties will be dealt out 
for non-compliance; and credits from CDM and JI will be incorporated in the first and second 
phase, respectively. 
Calls for “early action” to be taken into account have also been met in so far as Member 
States have a free reign over the distribution of permits and can therefore chose to allocate 
allowances on the basis of historical emissions and select an early base year if they wish to do 
so.  Furthermore, fierce lobbying from the German Chemical Industry Association appears to 
have paid off, as chemical installations are due to be excluded from the first phase of trading.   
On the other hand, three elements that Germany had pressed for will not be included in the 
final scheme: the voluntary, three-year pilot phase; absolute rather than flexible emissions 
caps; and an “opt-out” clause giving Member States the right to withdraw sectors from the 
scheme.  As the finally approved opt-out applies to installations rather than to sectors it will 
be much harder – if not impossible – for an entire sector to opt-out of the EU ETS.  It is also 
improbable that pooling will materialize in the absence of a mandatory obligation, as 
companies achieving emissions below their allocations are unlikely to want to give away 
surplus permits to laggards within their potential pool (Stiansen 2003).   
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In the meantime, some Federal states (Länder) have taken the ET concept one step further 
and started their own “test” systems to gain experience before the EU-wide system comes into 
effect in 2005. A pilot project was conducted in Hesse, Germany from August 2000 to May 
2001. 
4 Did the EU influence domestic climate policy?  
In domestic politics, two major paths feed into the formation of national interests. Both of 
these paths influence the objectives of climate change policy and affect policy instrument 
choice. First, societal interests, which are formed by values, norms and principles, guide 
policymakers and public opinion, and determine what reaches the policy agenda. Second, the 
national economy, which is represented by elements such as industrial structure and energy 
profile, shapes the national interest, and in doing so, directs policy choice. Below, we discuss 
these two paths in more detail, starting with the latter.  
4.1  National interests shape policy instrument choice 
In the ET discourse, significant shifts have occurred in the relative positions of Norway and 
Germany since the early 1990s.   
Norway has supported the idea of an international ETS from a very early stage. Although 
this stance conflicted with the position of environmental groups, the principle of cost-
effectiveness ran deep in the thinking of government officials and other key policymakers. It 
provided the opportunity for a broad range of sectors and gases to be incorporated in a single 
trading system that promoted the most cost-effective emissions reductions. In this setting, the 
Norwegian industrial lobby was able to push international ET onto the policy agenda, and 
played a major role in Norway’s decision to opt for an ETS from 2008-12. As for the pre-
Kyoto ETS from 2005, Norwegian industry was successful in protecting its interests at the 
EU-level through its European branch associations when it became clear that the Norwegian 
government preferred an early ETS to voluntary agreements. 
The European business lobby had a major influence on the design of the EU ETS 
(Markussen and Svendsen, forthcoming). In particular, the aluminum industry was successful 
in securing exemptions from the European system. In Norway, this resulted in the aluminum 
industry taking on voluntary agreements instead of participating in the pre-Kyoto ETS.  
The proposed Norwegian pre-Kyoto ETS would not have been politically acceptable to the 
EU, therefore Norway has been forced to take into consideration an alternative approach. 
Given its longstanding enthusiasm for a broad international ETS, it is significant that as an 
EEA member it has been forced to adapt to the less ambitious EU ETS. The government’s 
failure to negotiate any special considerations based on its unusual economic and energy 
structure points to the constraints that international factors have placed on the country’s 
domestic policy choice.  External and domestic factors had interacted to redefine Norway’s 
national interests, and the EU had demonstrated its power as a supranational force to 
influence domestic policy. 
In contrast, Germany wanted to make emissions reductions domestically at the outset. Its 
industrial structure, the process of reunification, and a high dependency on fossil fuels (coal 
in particular), made it possible to achieve substantial reductions during the 1990s using a 
command and control approach. The industry sector agreed to shoulder emissions reductions, 
but preferred voluntary agreements that allowed cutbacks to be distributed within sectors. 
Industry associations initially resisted replacing these voluntary agreements with ET. As had 
been the case in Norway, the German industry lobby strongly shaped the government’s 
positions on the issue. However, in contrast, it opposed ET because the voluntary agreement 
was more economically attractive.  
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Our assessment indicates that Germany, along with Norway, has accepted the EU ETS as 
the new preferred policy instrument as a result of changed perceptions about national 
interests. As an EU member country, Germany is bound by the economic regulations of the 
common market. Having first resisted the introduction of the ETS, Germany has since 2001 
been active in trying to influence the system, and has even started a pilot scheme to prepare 
for the EU launch in 2005. 
In other words, Norway and Germany’s very different economic and energy structures to 
some extent explain why their national interests, and consequently their early positions on 
emissions trading, were so polarized. The EU’s sudden interest in ET, however, acted as 
common external force pressing both domestic arenas for change, and serving to redefine 
national interests in both countries. In Germany, ET not only entered the agenda, but became 
the centerpiece of the country’s climate policy program. On the other hand, in Norway, where 
ET had been championed for over a decade, the comprehensive domestic system that the 
country had proposed was watered down so that it could be harmonized with the EU ETS. 
Thus from very different starting points in the early 1990s, German and Norwegian attitudes 
to ET as a climate policy instrument have converged to imitate the EU directive. 
4.2 Common objectives shape direction of climate policy  
Although Norway and Germany have both arrived at the conclusion that ETS is the best 
means of reaching their policy objectives, it is interesting to note that their policy goals have 
remained remarkably stable.  
We have already observed that as a result of decisions taken at Kyoto, the EU had 
reluctantly embraced the new policy concept of ET. Its objectives at the climate negotiations 
had been to promote stringent emissions reductions, to secure the internal market’s 
international competitiveness, and to take on a leadership role in global climate change 
policy. ET now became the vehicle by which the EU could pursue those objectives. Hence, 
ET was a novel idea that was originally introduced by the United States, and diffused via the 
international negotiations to influence EU climate policy.  
However, the EU’s underlying objectives remained unchanged. Instead, it was gradually 
persuaded that ET represented a window of opportunity for the re-launch of its climate policy, 
a means through which it could meet Kyoto targets cost-effectively, and a chance to reassert 
its global leadership credentials as an environmental frontrunner. “A synergistic and 
multilevel mix of explanatory factors, including developments at the international, EU, 
Members State, sub-national, and even down to the personal level” heralded a U-turn in EU 
attitude towards ET as a climate policy instrument and resulted in the establishment of the 
first regional GHG ETS of its kind in Europe (Christiansen and Wettestad 2003: 3). 
 Norway and Germany have had similar climate policy objectives. In both countries, 
several elements have been critical: the precautionary principle, the polluter pays principle, 
the desire for leadership, the promotion of environmentally efficient commitments, and the 
protection of the industry sector’s competitiveness. The precautionary principle and the 
polluter pays principle are ideas that have been accepted in environmental foreign policy 
since the first UN Conference on Environment and Development in Stockholm in 1972. To a 
large extent these ideas and objectives have been kept in the policy loop by environmental 
pressure groups, and a consistently “green” public opinion in both Norway and Germany.  
Both countries have expressed a desire for leadership on this particular issue. For Norway, 
a leadership role has been credible due to the country’s established “green” reputation. The 
environment represented a “soft” policy issue that even a small country could try to influence. 
For Germany, climate change has been one of a limited number of international areas where it 
could demonstrate leadership in spite of its history.  
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While it was important for both countries that environmental efficiency was taken into 
account, there was also considerable concern that this should not be at the expense of 
international competitiveness. These principles and objectives therefore had to be balanced 
against economic and industrial interests. Similar policy goals in the end led to acceptance of 
the ETS as a preferred policy instrument. 
5 Conclusions 
The EU ETS has not emerged from a vacuum. The idea of using ET as a policy instrument 
was inspired by the international climate regime and subsequently pioneered by the EU, 
which has successfully influenced the policy contexts within EU member and non-member 
states alike. 
We have pointed out that pressure from national and international forces shaped policy 
instrument choice in Norway and Germany. We found that bargains struck among interest 
groups and governments were important in defining national interests, and that the EU 
through the common market was (and is) vital in forming these interests in both Norway and 
Germany. Not only were international factors like the Kyoto Protocol and global 
competitiveness significant, but the development of the EU as an ever-expanding political and 
economic union has been an international force that neither European country could afford to 
ignore.  
Despite the structural differences between the countries, EU influence has presented ETS as 
the most cost-effective policy instrument for Germany and Norway to meet their Kyoto 
commitments. Norway started off being enthusiastic about an international ETS under the 
Kyoto Protocol at a time when Germany was openly against it. The former had supported the 
concept of flexibility mechanisms in the international negotiations as early as 1991, while the 
latter remained deeply entrenched in its command and control policy orientation until the 
close of the decade. When the EU changed its position in light of events at Kyoto, it caused a 
policy transfer in Germany.  Norway, meanwhile, has moved from a position where it 
promoted a comprehensive and flexible international ETS to one where it has adapted to the 
EU ETS to protect its national interests. Hence, the EU has restricted Norway’s ability to 
shape its own domestic policy.  
When the EU initiated the Proposal for a Directive on ETS in 2001, it helped chart the 
course for domestic climate policy debate in Germany and Norway. Developments at the EU 
level reshaped national political and economic landscapes, and redefined domestic and 
international interests. Now that the scheme has been approved, the established trading 
system represents a vehicle for the EU, Germany and Norway to reach their broadly common 
climate policy goals. As highlighted in our analytical framework, the development of national 
ETSs can best be described as a policy instrument transfer. Our conclusion is that the 
dynamic interaction of national factors, international forces, and EU influence has changed 
perceptions towards ET as a policy tool in both Germany and Norway.   
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